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Enhancing transparency could be a powerful deterrent. The European Council conclusions of December also stressed the need to take rapidly further action against terrorist financing in all domains.
Union measures should also accurately reflect developments and commitments undertaken at international level. Those UNSCRs deal with, respectively, the links between terrorism and transnational organised crime, preventing terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions and expanding the sanctions framework to include Islamic State in Iraq and Levant.
Providers engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies that is to say coins and banknotes that are designated as legal tender and electronic money, of a country, accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country as well as custodian wallet providers are under no Union obligation to identify suspicious activity.
Therefore, terrorist groups may be able to transfer money into the Union financial system or within virtual currency networks by concealing transfers or by benefiting from a certain degree of anonymity on those platforms.
Such monitoring would provide a balanced and proportional approach, safeguarding technical advances and the high degree of transparency attained in the field of alternative finance and social entrepreneurship.
The anonymity of virtual currencies allows their potential misuse for criminal purposes. The inclusion of providers engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies and custodian wallet providers will not entirely address the issue of anonymity attached to virtual currency transactions, as a large part of the virtual currency environment will remain anonymous because users can also transact without such providers.
To combat the risks related to the anonymity, national Financial Intelligence Units FIUs should be able to obtain information allowing them to associate virtual currency addresses to the identity of the owner of virtual currency.
In addition, the possibility to allow users to self-declare to designated authorities on a voluntary basis should be further assessed.
Although virtual currencies can frequently be used as a means of payment, they could also be used for other purposes and find broader applications such as means of exchange, investment, store-of-value products or use in online casinos.
The objective of this Directive is to cover all the potential uses of virtual currencies. Local currencies, also known as complementary currencies, that are used in very limited networks such as a city or a region and among a small number of users should not be considered to be virtual currencies.
When dealing with such cases of high-risk and with such business relationships or transactions, Member States should require obliged entities to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures to manage and mitigate those risks.
Each Member State therefore determines at national level the type of enhanced due diligence measures to be taken with regard to high-risk third countries.
Those different approaches between Member States create weak spots on the management of business relationships involving high-risk third countries as identified by the Commission.
It is important to improve the effectiveness of the list of high-risk third countries established by the Commission by providing for a harmonised treatment of those countries at Union level.
That harmonised approach should primarily focus on enhanced customer due diligence measures, where such measures are not already required under national law.
In accordance with international obligations, Member States should be allowed to require obliged entities, where applicable, to apply additional mitigating measures complementary to the enhanced customer due diligence measures, in accordance with a risk based approach and taking into account the specific circumstances of business relationships or transactions.
International organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing may call for the application of appropriate countermeasures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial risks relating to money laundering and terrorist financing emanating from certain countries.
In addition, Member States should require obliged entities to apply additional mitigating measures regarding high-risk third countries identified by the Commission by taking into account calls for countermeasures and recommendations, such as those expressed by the FATF, and responsibilities resulting from international agreements.
General purpose prepaid cards have legitimate uses and constitute an instrument contributing to social and financial inclusion.
However, anonymous prepaid cards are easy to use in financing terrorist attacks and logistics. While the use of anonymous prepaid cards issued in the Union is essentially limited to the Union territory only, that is not always the case with similar cards issued in third countries.
It is therefore important to ensure that anonymous prepaid cards issued outside the Union can be used in the Union only where they can be considered to comply with requirements equivalent to those set out in Union law.
That rule should be enacted in full compliance with Union obligations in respect of international trade, especially the provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
FIUs play an important role in identifying the financial operations of terrorist networks, especially cross-border, and in detecting their financial backers.
Financial intelligence might be of fundamental importance in uncovering the facilitation of terrorist offences and the networks and schemes of terrorist organisations.
Due to a lack of prescriptive international standards, FIUs maintain significant differences as regards their functions, competences and powers.
Member States should endeavour to ensure a more efficient and coordinated approach to deal with financial investigations related to terrorism, including those related to the misuse of virtual currencies.
In the exercise of their tasks, FIUs should have access to information and be able to exchange it without impediments, including through appropriate cooperation with law enforcement authorities.
In all cases of suspected criminality and, in particular, in cases involving the financing of terrorism, information should flow directly and quickly without undue delays.
It is therefore essential to further enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of FIUs, by clarifying the powers of and cooperation between FIUs. FIUs should be able to obtain from any obliged entity all the necessary information relating to their functions.
Their unfettered access to information is essential to ensure that flows of money can be properly traced and illicit networks and flows detected at an early stage.
FIUs should therefore in the context of their functions be able to obtain information from any obliged entity, even without a prior report being made.
This does not include indiscriminate requests for information to the obliged entities in the context of the FIU's analysis, but only information requests based on sufficiently defined conditions.
The purpose of the FIU is to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and to disseminate the results of its analysis as well as additional information to the competent authorities where there are grounds to suspect money laundering, associated predicate offences or financing of terrorism.
An FIU should not refrain from or refuse the exchange of information to another FIU, spontaneously or upon request, for reasons such as a lack of identification of an associated predicate offence, features of criminal national laws and differences between the definitions of associated predicate offences or the absence of a reference to particular associated predicate offences.
Similarly, an FIU should grant its prior consent to another FIU to forward the information to competent authorities regardless of the type of possible associated predicate offence in order to allow the dissemination function to be carried out effectively.
FIUs have reported difficulties in exchanging information based on differences in national definitions of certain predicate offences, such as tax crimes, which are not harmonised by Union law.
Such differences, should not hamper the mutual exchange, the dissemination to competent authorities and the use of that information as defined by this Directive.
Delayed access to information by FIUs and other competent authorities on the identity of holders of bank and payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes, especially anonymous ones, hampers the detection of transfers of funds relating to terrorism.
National data allowing the identification of bank and payments accounts and safe-deposit boxes belonging to one person is fragmented and therefore not accessible to FIUs and to other competent authorities in a timely manner.
It is therefore essential to establish centralised automated mechanisms, such as a register or data retrieval system, in all Member States as an efficient means to get timely access to information on the identity of holders of bank and payment accounts and safe-deposit boxes, their proxy holders, and their beneficial owners.
When applying the access provisions, it is appropriate for pre-existing mechanisms to be used provided that national FIUs can access the data for which they make inquiries in an immediate and unfiltered manner.
Member States should consider feeding such mechanisms with other information deemed necessary and proportionate for the more effective mitigation of risks relating to money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Full confidentiality should be ensured in respect of such inquiries and requests for related information by FIUs and competent authorities other than those authorities responsible for prosecution.
It should be possible for Member States to determine which data it is useful and proportionate to gather, taking into account the systems and legal traditions in place to enable the meaningful identification of the beneficial owners.
When transposing the provisions relating to those mechanisms, Member States should set out retention periods equivalent to the period for retention of the documentation and information obtained within the application of customer due diligence measures.
It should be possible for Member States to extend the retention period on a general basis by law, without requiring case-by-case decisions.
The additional retention period should not exceed an additional five years. That period should be without prejudice to national law setting out other data retention requirements allowing case-by-case decisions to facilitate criminal or administrative proceedings.
Access to those mechanisms should be on a need-to-know basis. Accurate identification and verification of data of natural and legal persons are essential for fighting money laundering or terrorist financing.
The latest technical developments in the digitalisation of transactions and payments enable a secure remote or electronic identification.
In addition, other secure remote or electronic identification processes, regulated, recognised, approved or accepted at national level by the national competent authority may be taken into account.
The principle of technology neutrality should be taken into account in the application of this Directive. In order to identify politically exposed persons in the Union, lists should be issued by Member States indicating the specific functions which, in accordance with national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, qualify as prominent public functions.
Member States should request each international organisation accredited on their territories to issue and keep up to date a list of prominent public functions at that international organisation.
The approach for the review of existing customers in the current framework is risk-based. However, given the higher risk of money laundering, terrorist financing and associated predicate offences associated with certain intermediary structures, that approach might not allow for the timely detection and assessment of risks.
It is therefore important to ensure that certain clearly specified categories of existing customers are also monitored on a regular basis. Member States are currently required to ensure that corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on their beneficial ownership.
The need for accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial owner is a key factor in tracing criminals who might otherwise be able to hide their identity behind a corporate structure.
The globally interconnected financial system makes it possible to hide and move funds around the world, and money launderers and terrorist financers as well as other criminals have increasingly made use of that possibility.
The specific factor determining which Member State is responsible for the monitoring and registration of beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be clarified.
Due to differences in the legal systems of Member States, certain trusts and similar legal arrangements are not monitored or registered anywhere in the Union.
Beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be registered where the trustees of trusts and persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements are established or where they reside.
In order to ensure the effective monitoring and registration of information on the beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, cooperation between Member States is also necessary.
Rules that apply to trusts and similar legal arrangements with respect to access to information relating to their beneficial ownership should be comparable to the corresponding rules that apply to corporate and other legal entities.
Due to the wide range of types of trusts that currently exists in the Union, as well as an even greater variety of similar legal arrangements, the decision on whether or not a trust or a similar legal arrangement is comparably similar to corporate and other legal entities should be taken by Member States.
The aim of the national law transposing those provisions should be to prevent the use of trusts or similar legal arrangements for the purposes of money laundering, terrorist financing or associated predicate offences.
With a view to the different characteristics of trusts and similar legal arrangements, Member States should be able, under national law and in accordance with data protection rules, to determine the level of transparency with regard to trusts and similar legal arrangements that are not comparable to corporate and other legal entities.
The risks of money laundering and terrorist financing involved can differ, based on the characteristics of the type of trust or similar legal arrangement and the understanding of those risks can evolve over time, for instance as a result of the national and supranational risk assessments.
For that reason, it should be possible for Member States to provide for wider access to information on beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, if such access constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure with the legitimate aim of preventing the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing.
When determining the level of transparency of the beneficial ownership information of such trusts or similar legal arrangements, Member States should have due regard to the protection of fundamental rights of individuals, in particular the right to privacy and protection of personal data.
Access to beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be granted to any person that can demonstrate a legitimate interest.
Access should also be granted to any person that files a written request in relation to a trust or similar legal arrangement which holds or owns a controlling interest in any corporate or other legal entity incorporated outside the Union, through direct or indirect ownership, including through bearer shareholdings, or through control via other means.
The criteria and conditions granting access to requests for beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be sufficiently precise and in line with the aims of this Directive.
It should be possible for Member States to refuse a written request where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the written request is not in line with the objectives of this Directive.
In order to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field, it is essential to clearly set out which legal arrangements established across the Union should be considered similar to trusts by effect of their functions or structure.
Therefore, each Member State should be required to identify the trusts, if recognised by national law, and similar legal arrangements that may be set up pursuant to its national legal framework or custom and which have structure or functions similar to trusts, such as enabling a separation or disconnection between the legal and the beneficial ownership of assets.
Thereafter, Member States should notify to the Commission the categories, description of the characteristics, names and where applicable legal basis of those trusts and similar legal arrangements in view of their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union in order to enable their identification by other Member States.
It should be taken into account that trusts and similar legal arrangements may have different legal characteristics throughout the Union.
Where the characteristics of the trust or similar legal arrangement are comparable in structure or functions to the characteristics of corporate and other legal entities, public access to beneficial ownership information would contribute to combating the misuse of trusts and similar legal arrangements, similar to the way public access can contribute to the prevention of the misuse of corporate and other legal entities for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Public access to beneficial ownership information allows greater scrutiny of information by civil society, including by the press or civil society organisations, and contributes to preserving trust in the integrity of business transactions and of the financial system.
It can contribute to combating the misuse of corporate and other legal entities and legal arrangements for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, both by helping investigations and through reputational effects, given that anyone who could enter into transactions is aware of the identity of the beneficial owners.
It also facilitates the timely and efficient availability of information for financial institutions as well as authorities, including authorities of third countries, involved in combating such offences.
The access to that information would also help investigations on money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing.
Confidence in financial markets from investors and the general public depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of companies.
This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characterised by concentrated ownership, such as the one in the Union. On the one hand, large investors with significant voting and cash-flow rights may encourage long-term growth and firm performance.
On the other hand, however, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have incentives to divert corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the expense of minority investors.
The potential increase in confidence in financial markets should be regarded as a positive side effect and not the purpose of increasing transparency, which is to create an environment less likely to be used for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Confidence in financial markets from investors and the general public depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of corporate and other legal entities as well as certain types of trusts and similar legal arrangements.
Member States should therefore allow access to beneficial ownership information in a sufficiently coherent and coordinated way, by establishing clear rules of access by the public, so that third parties are able to ascertain, throughout the Union, who are the beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities as well as of certain types of trusts and similar legal arrangements.
Member States should therefore allow access to beneficial ownership information on corporate and other legal entities in a sufficiently coherent and coordinated way, through the central registers in which beneficial ownership information is set out, by establishing a clear rule of public access, so that third parties are able to ascertain, throughout the Union, who are the beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities.
It is essential to also establish a coherent legal framework that ensures better access to information relating to beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, once they are registered within the Union.
The set of data to be made available to the public should be limited, clearly and exhaustively defined, and should be of a general nature, so as to minimise the potential prejudice to the beneficial owners.
At the same time, information made accessible to the public should not significantly differ from the data currently collected. In order to limit the interference with the right to respect for their private life in general and to protection of their personal data in particular, that information should relate essentially to the status of beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities and of trusts and similar legal arrangements and should strictly concern the sphere of economic activity in which the beneficial owners operate.
In cases where the senior managing official has been identified as the beneficial owner only ex officio and not through ownership interest held or control exercised by other means, this should be clearly visible in the registers.
With regard to information on beneficial owners, Member States can provide for information on nationality to be included in the central register particularly for non-native beneficial owners.
In order to facilitate registry procedures and as the vast majority of beneficial owners will be nationals of the state maintaining the central register, Member States may presume a beneficial owner to be of their own nationality where no entry to the contrary is made.
The enhanced public scrutiny will contribute to preventing the misuse of legal entities and legal arrangements, including tax avoidance.
Therefore, it is essential that the information on beneficial ownership remains available through the national registers and through the system of interconnection of registers for a minimum of five years after the grounds for registering beneficial ownership information of the trust or similar legal arrangement have ceased to exist.
However, Member States should be able to provide by law for the processing of the information on beneficial ownership, including personal data for other purposes if such processing meets an objective of public interest and constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to the legitimate aim pursued.
Moreover, with the aim of ensuring a proportionate and balanced approach and to guarantee the rights to private life and personal data protection, it should be possible for Member States to provide for exemptions to the disclosure through the registers of beneficial ownership information and to access to such information, in exceptional circumstances, where that information would expose the beneficial owner to a disproportionate risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, harassment, violence or intimidation.
It should also be possible for Member States to require online registration in order to identify any person who requests information from the register, as well as the payment of a fee for access to the information in the register.
This entails the adoption of technical measures and specifications which need to take account of differences between registers. In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to tackle such technical and operational issues.
In any case, the involvement of Member States in the functioning of the whole system should be ensured by means of a regular dialogue between the Commission and the representatives of Member States on the issues concerning the operation of the system and on its future development.
As a consequence, natural persons whose personal data are held in national registers as beneficial owners should be informed accordingly.
In addition, to prevent the abuse of the information contained in the registers and to balance out the rights of beneficial owners, Member States might find it appropriate to consider making information relating to the requesting person along with the legal basis for their request available to the beneficial owner.
Where the reporting of discrepancies by the FIUs and competent authorities would jeopardise an on-going investigation, the FIUs or competent authorities should delay the reporting of the discrepancy until the moment at which the reasons for not reporting cease to exist.
Furthermore, FIUs and competent authorities should not report any discrepancy when this would be contrary to any confidentiality provision of national law or would constitute a tipping-off offence.
Access to information and the definition of legitimate interest should be governed by the law of the Member State where the trustee of a trust or person holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement is established or resides.
Where the trustee of the trust or person holding equivalent position in similar legal arrangement is not established or does not reside in any Member State, access to information and the definition of legitimate interest should be governed by the law of the Member State where the beneficial ownership information of the trust or similar legal arrangement is registered in accordance with the provisions of this Directive.
Member States should define legitimate interest, both as a general concept and as a criterion for accessing beneficial ownership information in their national law.
Retrieved Deutsche Welle. Banknote News. Retrieved 10 January European Commission. Archived from the original on 11 September BBC News.
British Broadcasting Corporation. Bloomberg Businessweek. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 31 July Central Bank of Ireland.
Retrieved 21 August August Retrieved 7 July The banknotes show a geographical representation of Europe.
It excludes islands of less than square kilometres because high-volume offset printing does not permit the accurate reproduction of small design elements.
Our Money. Retrieved 5 December December Retrieved 13 October Euro topics. Proposed eurobonds Reserve currency Petroeuro World currency.
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